Zakaria and Samuelson about the crisis
Fareed Zakaria and Robert J. Samuelson, among others, express their opinion about the crisis in the most recent issue of Newsweek.
For Fareed Zakaria the most critical aspect is the banking crisis. Says he, we haven't turned the corner on the banking crisis, we can't even see the corner... the American public believes that we have already spent far too much money on bailing out the banks; but the economic fact is that we have not spent enough; without several hundreds of billions of dollars, these organizations will remain zombies and the economy will remain paralyzed.
For Robert J. Samuelson, the most critical aspect is that the crisis is global. He sees three interwoven dimensions: the spending crisis, the lending crisis and the trade crisis. While the first two dimensions could be tackled in principle at national level (by stimulus and rescue politics), the third aspect needs concertation at global level. Says he, as Americans save more of their incomes, Asians should save less, and spend more, to generate growth as opposed to exports. And he concludes, this sort of transformation requires basic political changes in Asia to complement changes in U.S. policies; whether China and other Asian societies can make those changes is unclear; the implications are sobering. The success of Obama's policies lies, to a considerable extent, outside Obama's hands.
Here are the two articles:
1. Fareed Zakaria: There's More To Fear Than Fear
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first inaugural address is now known for only one sentence: The only thing we have to fear is fear itself. But the audience at the time paid little attention to that line and the newspapers buried it in their reports the next day. As Jonathan Alter recounts in his book The Defining Moment, the words that got the greatest applause were something more specific. I shall ask Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis, FDR said, broad Executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe. The next day's headline in The New York Herald Tribune was FOR DICTATORSHIP IF NECESSARY.
We are not in 1933, and no one would advocate or encourage any such power grab today. But President Barack Obama will have to quickly start planning for a set of more extraordinary measures to pull the United States out of its current, unsustainable economic condition. The president has understandably focused his first few days on important campaign promises—ending torture, closing Guantánamo—but he will now have to tackle the biggest challenge facing the country.
The American economy is entering its sharpest economic contraction since 1974—a recession that is likely to be the longest since the Second World War. But that's not the worst of it. The American financial system is effectively broken. Major banks are moving toward insolvency, and credit activity remains extremely weak. As long as the financial sector remains moribund, American consumers and companies—who collectively make up 80 percent of GDP—will not have access to credit, and economic activity cannot really resume on any significant scale. We have not turned the corner. In fact, we can't even see the corner right now. In Washington and in the media, we have all stopped thinking about the rescue of the financial system—that was last year's story—and moved on to the automobile bailout and now the fiscal stimulus. Debates have begun as to whether programs represent pork or investment, whether tax cuts should be preferred to government spending. But despite the injection of hundreds of billions of dollars, and the promise of many billions more, banks are still not lending. Without a functioning financial system, even a massive stimulus will not restore the economy to a normal growth trajectory. Japan tried to jump-start its economy with the world's largest fiscal stimulus in the 1990s. It did nothing for long-term growth in that country.
What about the actions taken so far? The $700 billion TARP, the various federal guarantees, the Federal Reserve's extraordinary actions? The outgoing administration has plausibly claimed that these have worked—in the sense that the financial system has not imploded. Paul Krugman, no fan of the Bush administration's approach to the crisis, acknowledges, without the bank bailout, the whole system would have collapsed. But the bailout has not solved the problem; banks are still buried under mountains of bad assets. And while the Bush administration has made mistakes—most of them clearer in hindsight—the Obama economic team knows that there is no simple answer to this extraordinarily complex situation. Britain, which was widely lauded for its first set of bank bailouts, appears to have stumbled in a second set of policies last week. This might be the time to recall screenwriter William Goldman's cardinal rule about Hollywood: Nobody knows anything.
And yet the government has to do something. President Obama faces a terrible dilemma. He needs to act quickly and on a massive scale. Part of what has unnerved markets has been the incremental nature of the government's response. Will it bail out this bank or that one? On what terms? A broad systemic approach commits the government to one course—one solution—and does not allow for experimentation. It is also enormously expensive. And yet without large-scale action, the financial system will keep bleeding. The politics of this are even worse. The American public believes that we have already spent far too much money on bailing out the banks. But the economic fact is that we have not spent enough. Without several hundreds of billions of dollars, these organizations will remain zombies and the economy will remain paralyzed.
Speed is also crucial. In U.S. policy-making circles in the 1990s it was customary to deride the Japanese government for its weak response to the bursting of Japan's real-estate and stock-market bubble—which led to more than a decade of economic stagnation. In fact the Japanese took drastic action: they injected capital into their banks, lowered interest rates and undertook a massive fiscal stimulus. But they waited for a couple of years before confronting their problems and that made the measures far less effective. The Federal Reserve has learned its lesson and has moved much faster than did the Bank of Japan. But will the American political system move any faster than the Japanese political system?
There remains a spirited debate over what should be done now. But at its heart everyone seems to agree with former Treasury secretary Hank Paulson's original diagnosis—the problem is that banks have huge amounts of bad assets (related to mortgages) on their books. These assets are toxic because they infect the rest of the banks' balances, making it difficult for them to operate. These assets must be disclosed, written down and quarantined for the financial system to start functioning again.
Some now argue for a national aggregator bank that would buy up all the toxic assets, still others for a set of government guarantees and insurance, others still for outright nationalization of the worst-off institutions. Paulson's January rescue of Citicorp seemed to use TARP money in an effective way, getting a large bang for the buck. Each policy has its merits and drawbacks, and I am not expert enough to judge which is the right approach. But it does appear crucial that the government's response be systemic. Ideologies need to be suspended in this period of crisis—we don't hear much about moral hazard anymore. We might temporarily limit practices that are causing a downward spiral—such as marking assets to market, the practice of forcing banks to keep lowering the price of securities (even those that they do not intend to sell), which then forces them to raise more capital. Overall, the government must send markets a clear signal: it is futile to bet against us; we have unlimited tools at our disposal and will use them; and in the end we will win.
Tackling the banks will not be the end of these problems. As President Obama has often pointed out, until the housing market stabilizes, the crisis will continue. Housing is what underpins many of these toxic assets. If prices continue to fall, the assets will only become more toxic. A veteran investment banker, Thomas Patrick, has circulated an innovative proposal that would have Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac close out the securitizations and then refinance all the underlying mortgages, thus dispensing with the toxic paper and stabilizing the mortgages in one swoop. No matter what course is taken, the United States will run trillion-dollar deficits for years, the Federal Reserve will accumulate trillions on its balance sheet, and the American financial and mortgage system will have been semi-nationalized, whatever the euphemisms used to disguise that fact.
This current crisis has resulted in a deep erosion of American power that we have not fully understood. Even in the depths of the Iraq War, when much of the globe was enraged by George W. Bush's unilateralism, people everywhere believed that the United States had the world's most advanced economy and that its capital markets in particular were the most sophisticated and developed. American officials, businessmen and economists lectured far and wide on the need to copy the American system. That system is now seen across the world as a sham, a casino game in which highly paid participants mismanaged risk and highly respected regulators cheered them on. I have traveled to Europe, Asia and the Middle East in the past three months and am writing this from Canada. The attitudes of officials and businessmen range from shock to rage at what they see in the United States.
When he began his run for the White House, Barack Obama thought he could restore American power and leadership by righting our foreign policy, winding down the Iraq War, closing Guantánamo, ending torture. These are all important policies, and I am glad that he is pursuing them. But right now, the most important way for him to restore America's credibility and influence in the world is to rescue the American model.
Obama's rhetoric suggests that he understands this issue. But does Congress? Can the American political system rise to the challenge? The United States will have to enact extraordinary measures, many of them unpopular, run up huge deficits, then just as quickly start to unwind these guarantees and commitments, get onto a path of strict fiscal prudence, reform entitlements and bring our financial house in order. If we don't, the world will talk not of American power but weakness. America will be a model, all right, but of pride and its fall.
2. Robert J. Samuelson: It's Really a Global Crisis
We should all want President Obama to succeed in reviving the economy, but that shouldn't obscure the long odds he faces. We need to recognize that we're not grappling with a single economic crisis. We face three separate crises, which are interwoven but which are also distinct and different. The solution to any one of them won't automatically resuscitate the larger economy if the others remain untreated and unchanged.
Here are the three.
FIRST: the collapse of consumer spending. American consumers represent 70 percent of the economy. Traumatized by plunging home values and stock prices—which have shaved at least $7 trillion from personal wealth—they've curbed spending and increased saving. That's led directly to layoffs and higher unemployment. In December, auto and light-truck sales were down 36 percent from a year earlier.
SECOND: the financial crisis. Lending has atrophied, depriving the economy of the credit to finance new factories, homes and costly consumer purchases (cars, appliances). The deepest cuts involve securitization—the sale of bonds. Investors have gone on strike. In 2008, the issuance of investment-grade corporate bonds dropped 35 percent, reports Thomson Financial. Bonds backing credit-card loans fell 41 percent, and those backing car loans, 51 percent.
THIRD: the trade crisis. There's a mismatch between national spending and saving patterns. High-saving Asian countries relied on export-led growth that, in turn, required American consumers to spend ever-larger shares of their income. Huge trade imbalances resulted: U.S. deficits, Asian surpluses. But as Americans shift from spending to saving, this pattern is no longer sustainable. Asia is tumbling into recession. China may grow 6 percent or less in 2009, half its 2007 rate.
Overcoming any of these crises alone would be daunting. Together, they're the economic equivalent of a combined triathlon and Tour de France.
Consider consumer spending. The proposed remedy is the economic stimulus plan. On paper, this seems sensible. If government doesn't offset declines in consumer spending, housing and business investment, might not the economy spiral downward for several years? Last week, House committees considered an $825 billion package, split between $550 billion in additional spending and $275 billion in tax cuts.
The trouble is that, in practice, the program could disappoint. Parts of the House package look like a giant political slush fund, with money sprinkled to dozens of programs. There's $50 million for the National Endowment for the Arts, $200 million for the Teacher Incentive Fund and $15.6 billion for increased Pell Grants to college students. Some of these proposals, whatever their other merits, won't produce many new jobs.
Another problem: construction spending—for schools, clinics, roads—may start so slowly that there's little immediate boost for the $14 trillion economy. The Congressional Budget Office examined $356 billion in spending proposals and concluded that only 7 percent would be spent in 2009 and 31 percent in 2010.
But suppose the stimulus is a smashing success. It cushions the recession. Unemployment (now 7.2 percent) stops rising at, say, 8 percent instead of 10 percent. Still, a temporary stimulus can't fuel a permanent recovery. That requires, among other things, a strong financial system to supply the credit needs of an expanding economy. How we get that isn't clear.
The pillars of a successful financial system have crumbled: the ability to assess risk, adequate capital to absorb losses and trust among the players—banks, investors, traders. A common denominator in these ills has been the consistent underestimation of losses. Economists at Goldman Sachs now believe that worldwide losses on mortgages, bonds and consumer and business loans total $2.1 trillion, with $962 billion belonging to U.S. banks. In March, the Goldman estimate was about half that. Economist Nouriel Roubini's estimate of losses is higher than Goldman's.
All the new credit programs—the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program and various Federal Reserve lending facilities—aim at counteracting these problems by providing government money and government guarantees. Probably Obama will expand these efforts, despite some obvious problems: if government oversight becomes too intrusive or punitive, it might deter much-needed infusions of private capital into banks. Again, let's assume Obama's policies surmount the obstacles. Credit flows and confidence rises.
Even then, we have no assurance of a vigorous recovery, because—at bottom—the economic crisis is global in scope. The old trading patterns simply won't work anymore. If China and other Asian nations try to export their way out of trouble, they're likely to be disappointed. Any import surge into the United States would weaken an incipient American recovery and possibly trigger a protectionist reaction. Down that path lies tit-for-tat economic nationalism that might harm everyone. Growing trade and investment barriers would shrink markets.
Indeed, if the rest of the world doesn't buy more from America, any U.S. recovery may be feeble. What's needed are policies that correct the underlying imbalances in spending and saving. As Americans save more of their incomes, Asians should save less and spend more, so that they rely more on satisfying their own wants to generate jobs and economic growth as opposed to exports. The great trade discrepancies would shrink. Americans would export more, import less; Asians would do the opposite.
But this sort of transformation requires basic political changes in Asia to complement changes in U.S. policies. Whether China and other Asian societies can make those changes is unclear. The implications are sobering. The success of Obama's policies lies, to a considerable extent, outside Obama's hands.
(Zoon Politikon)
For Fareed Zakaria the most critical aspect is the banking crisis. Says he, we haven't turned the corner on the banking crisis, we can't even see the corner... the American public believes that we have already spent far too much money on bailing out the banks; but the economic fact is that we have not spent enough; without several hundreds of billions of dollars, these organizations will remain zombies and the economy will remain paralyzed.
For Robert J. Samuelson, the most critical aspect is that the crisis is global. He sees three interwoven dimensions: the spending crisis, the lending crisis and the trade crisis. While the first two dimensions could be tackled in principle at national level (by stimulus and rescue politics), the third aspect needs concertation at global level. Says he, as Americans save more of their incomes, Asians should save less, and spend more, to generate growth as opposed to exports. And he concludes, this sort of transformation requires basic political changes in Asia to complement changes in U.S. policies; whether China and other Asian societies can make those changes is unclear; the implications are sobering. The success of Obama's policies lies, to a considerable extent, outside Obama's hands.
Here are the two articles:
1. Fareed Zakaria: There's More To Fear Than Fear
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first inaugural address is now known for only one sentence: The only thing we have to fear is fear itself. But the audience at the time paid little attention to that line and the newspapers buried it in their reports the next day. As Jonathan Alter recounts in his book The Defining Moment, the words that got the greatest applause were something more specific. I shall ask Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis, FDR said, broad Executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe. The next day's headline in The New York Herald Tribune was FOR DICTATORSHIP IF NECESSARY.We are not in 1933, and no one would advocate or encourage any such power grab today. But President Barack Obama will have to quickly start planning for a set of more extraordinary measures to pull the United States out of its current, unsustainable economic condition. The president has understandably focused his first few days on important campaign promises—ending torture, closing Guantánamo—but he will now have to tackle the biggest challenge facing the country.
The American economy is entering its sharpest economic contraction since 1974—a recession that is likely to be the longest since the Second World War. But that's not the worst of it. The American financial system is effectively broken. Major banks are moving toward insolvency, and credit activity remains extremely weak. As long as the financial sector remains moribund, American consumers and companies—who collectively make up 80 percent of GDP—will not have access to credit, and economic activity cannot really resume on any significant scale. We have not turned the corner. In fact, we can't even see the corner right now. In Washington and in the media, we have all stopped thinking about the rescue of the financial system—that was last year's story—and moved on to the automobile bailout and now the fiscal stimulus. Debates have begun as to whether programs represent pork or investment, whether tax cuts should be preferred to government spending. But despite the injection of hundreds of billions of dollars, and the promise of many billions more, banks are still not lending. Without a functioning financial system, even a massive stimulus will not restore the economy to a normal growth trajectory. Japan tried to jump-start its economy with the world's largest fiscal stimulus in the 1990s. It did nothing for long-term growth in that country.
What about the actions taken so far? The $700 billion TARP, the various federal guarantees, the Federal Reserve's extraordinary actions? The outgoing administration has plausibly claimed that these have worked—in the sense that the financial system has not imploded. Paul Krugman, no fan of the Bush administration's approach to the crisis, acknowledges, without the bank bailout, the whole system would have collapsed. But the bailout has not solved the problem; banks are still buried under mountains of bad assets. And while the Bush administration has made mistakes—most of them clearer in hindsight—the Obama economic team knows that there is no simple answer to this extraordinarily complex situation. Britain, which was widely lauded for its first set of bank bailouts, appears to have stumbled in a second set of policies last week. This might be the time to recall screenwriter William Goldman's cardinal rule about Hollywood: Nobody knows anything.
And yet the government has to do something. President Obama faces a terrible dilemma. He needs to act quickly and on a massive scale. Part of what has unnerved markets has been the incremental nature of the government's response. Will it bail out this bank or that one? On what terms? A broad systemic approach commits the government to one course—one solution—and does not allow for experimentation. It is also enormously expensive. And yet without large-scale action, the financial system will keep bleeding. The politics of this are even worse. The American public believes that we have already spent far too much money on bailing out the banks. But the economic fact is that we have not spent enough. Without several hundreds of billions of dollars, these organizations will remain zombies and the economy will remain paralyzed.
Speed is also crucial. In U.S. policy-making circles in the 1990s it was customary to deride the Japanese government for its weak response to the bursting of Japan's real-estate and stock-market bubble—which led to more than a decade of economic stagnation. In fact the Japanese took drastic action: they injected capital into their banks, lowered interest rates and undertook a massive fiscal stimulus. But they waited for a couple of years before confronting their problems and that made the measures far less effective. The Federal Reserve has learned its lesson and has moved much faster than did the Bank of Japan. But will the American political system move any faster than the Japanese political system?
There remains a spirited debate over what should be done now. But at its heart everyone seems to agree with former Treasury secretary Hank Paulson's original diagnosis—the problem is that banks have huge amounts of bad assets (related to mortgages) on their books. These assets are toxic because they infect the rest of the banks' balances, making it difficult for them to operate. These assets must be disclosed, written down and quarantined for the financial system to start functioning again.
Some now argue for a national aggregator bank that would buy up all the toxic assets, still others for a set of government guarantees and insurance, others still for outright nationalization of the worst-off institutions. Paulson's January rescue of Citicorp seemed to use TARP money in an effective way, getting a large bang for the buck. Each policy has its merits and drawbacks, and I am not expert enough to judge which is the right approach. But it does appear crucial that the government's response be systemic. Ideologies need to be suspended in this period of crisis—we don't hear much about moral hazard anymore. We might temporarily limit practices that are causing a downward spiral—such as marking assets to market, the practice of forcing banks to keep lowering the price of securities (even those that they do not intend to sell), which then forces them to raise more capital. Overall, the government must send markets a clear signal: it is futile to bet against us; we have unlimited tools at our disposal and will use them; and in the end we will win.
Tackling the banks will not be the end of these problems. As President Obama has often pointed out, until the housing market stabilizes, the crisis will continue. Housing is what underpins many of these toxic assets. If prices continue to fall, the assets will only become more toxic. A veteran investment banker, Thomas Patrick, has circulated an innovative proposal that would have Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac close out the securitizations and then refinance all the underlying mortgages, thus dispensing with the toxic paper and stabilizing the mortgages in one swoop. No matter what course is taken, the United States will run trillion-dollar deficits for years, the Federal Reserve will accumulate trillions on its balance sheet, and the American financial and mortgage system will have been semi-nationalized, whatever the euphemisms used to disguise that fact.
This current crisis has resulted in a deep erosion of American power that we have not fully understood. Even in the depths of the Iraq War, when much of the globe was enraged by George W. Bush's unilateralism, people everywhere believed that the United States had the world's most advanced economy and that its capital markets in particular were the most sophisticated and developed. American officials, businessmen and economists lectured far and wide on the need to copy the American system. That system is now seen across the world as a sham, a casino game in which highly paid participants mismanaged risk and highly respected regulators cheered them on. I have traveled to Europe, Asia and the Middle East in the past three months and am writing this from Canada. The attitudes of officials and businessmen range from shock to rage at what they see in the United States.
When he began his run for the White House, Barack Obama thought he could restore American power and leadership by righting our foreign policy, winding down the Iraq War, closing Guantánamo, ending torture. These are all important policies, and I am glad that he is pursuing them. But right now, the most important way for him to restore America's credibility and influence in the world is to rescue the American model.
Obama's rhetoric suggests that he understands this issue. But does Congress? Can the American political system rise to the challenge? The United States will have to enact extraordinary measures, many of them unpopular, run up huge deficits, then just as quickly start to unwind these guarantees and commitments, get onto a path of strict fiscal prudence, reform entitlements and bring our financial house in order. If we don't, the world will talk not of American power but weakness. America will be a model, all right, but of pride and its fall.
2. Robert J. Samuelson: It's Really a Global Crisis
We should all want President Obama to succeed in reviving the economy, but that shouldn't obscure the long odds he faces. We need to recognize that we're not grappling with a single economic crisis. We face three separate crises, which are interwoven but which are also distinct and different. The solution to any one of them won't automatically resuscitate the larger economy if the others remain untreated and unchanged.Here are the three.
FIRST: the collapse of consumer spending. American consumers represent 70 percent of the economy. Traumatized by plunging home values and stock prices—which have shaved at least $7 trillion from personal wealth—they've curbed spending and increased saving. That's led directly to layoffs and higher unemployment. In December, auto and light-truck sales were down 36 percent from a year earlier.
SECOND: the financial crisis. Lending has atrophied, depriving the economy of the credit to finance new factories, homes and costly consumer purchases (cars, appliances). The deepest cuts involve securitization—the sale of bonds. Investors have gone on strike. In 2008, the issuance of investment-grade corporate bonds dropped 35 percent, reports Thomson Financial. Bonds backing credit-card loans fell 41 percent, and those backing car loans, 51 percent.
THIRD: the trade crisis. There's a mismatch between national spending and saving patterns. High-saving Asian countries relied on export-led growth that, in turn, required American consumers to spend ever-larger shares of their income. Huge trade imbalances resulted: U.S. deficits, Asian surpluses. But as Americans shift from spending to saving, this pattern is no longer sustainable. Asia is tumbling into recession. China may grow 6 percent or less in 2009, half its 2007 rate.
Overcoming any of these crises alone would be daunting. Together, they're the economic equivalent of a combined triathlon and Tour de France.
Consider consumer spending. The proposed remedy is the economic stimulus plan. On paper, this seems sensible. If government doesn't offset declines in consumer spending, housing and business investment, might not the economy spiral downward for several years? Last week, House committees considered an $825 billion package, split between $550 billion in additional spending and $275 billion in tax cuts.
The trouble is that, in practice, the program could disappoint. Parts of the House package look like a giant political slush fund, with money sprinkled to dozens of programs. There's $50 million for the National Endowment for the Arts, $200 million for the Teacher Incentive Fund and $15.6 billion for increased Pell Grants to college students. Some of these proposals, whatever their other merits, won't produce many new jobs.
Another problem: construction spending—for schools, clinics, roads—may start so slowly that there's little immediate boost for the $14 trillion economy. The Congressional Budget Office examined $356 billion in spending proposals and concluded that only 7 percent would be spent in 2009 and 31 percent in 2010.
But suppose the stimulus is a smashing success. It cushions the recession. Unemployment (now 7.2 percent) stops rising at, say, 8 percent instead of 10 percent. Still, a temporary stimulus can't fuel a permanent recovery. That requires, among other things, a strong financial system to supply the credit needs of an expanding economy. How we get that isn't clear.
The pillars of a successful financial system have crumbled: the ability to assess risk, adequate capital to absorb losses and trust among the players—banks, investors, traders. A common denominator in these ills has been the consistent underestimation of losses. Economists at Goldman Sachs now believe that worldwide losses on mortgages, bonds and consumer and business loans total $2.1 trillion, with $962 billion belonging to U.S. banks. In March, the Goldman estimate was about half that. Economist Nouriel Roubini's estimate of losses is higher than Goldman's.
All the new credit programs—the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program and various Federal Reserve lending facilities—aim at counteracting these problems by providing government money and government guarantees. Probably Obama will expand these efforts, despite some obvious problems: if government oversight becomes too intrusive or punitive, it might deter much-needed infusions of private capital into banks. Again, let's assume Obama's policies surmount the obstacles. Credit flows and confidence rises.
Even then, we have no assurance of a vigorous recovery, because—at bottom—the economic crisis is global in scope. The old trading patterns simply won't work anymore. If China and other Asian nations try to export their way out of trouble, they're likely to be disappointed. Any import surge into the United States would weaken an incipient American recovery and possibly trigger a protectionist reaction. Down that path lies tit-for-tat economic nationalism that might harm everyone. Growing trade and investment barriers would shrink markets.
Indeed, if the rest of the world doesn't buy more from America, any U.S. recovery may be feeble. What's needed are policies that correct the underlying imbalances in spending and saving. As Americans save more of their incomes, Asians should save less and spend more, so that they rely more on satisfying their own wants to generate jobs and economic growth as opposed to exports. The great trade discrepancies would shrink. Americans would export more, import less; Asians would do the opposite.
But this sort of transformation requires basic political changes in Asia to complement changes in U.S. policies. Whether China and other Asian societies can make those changes is unclear. The implications are sobering. The success of Obama's policies lies, to a considerable extent, outside Obama's hands.
(Zoon Politikon)
Labels: Fareed Zakaria, Samuelson
posted by Pierre Radulescu at
11:12 AM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home